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14.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we are concerned with explaining which types of firms have 
failed to adopt well-known improvements in process technology. This prob-
lem has, of course, been the underlying concern of all studies of diffusion 
"to rationalize why, if a new technology is superior, it is not taken up by all 
potential adopters" (Stoneman, 1983). Drawing on various theoretical per-
spectives, we identify a number of different barriers to adoption. With data 
collected from a 1987 nationally representative sample of US establishments 
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in 21 metal-working and machinery manufacturing industries, we then con-
struct a multivariate logistic regression model to empirically test for the 
effects of these factors on the likelihood of adoption of a particular process 
innovation, namely programmable automation CPA) machine tools. 
A widely accepted tenet of contemporary analyses of the diffusion of in-
novations is that certain types of organizations are better positioned than 
others to generate and to adopt innovations (David, 1969 and 1975; Mans-
field, 1968; Mansfield et ai., 1977; Nabseth and Ray, 1974; Stoneman, 1980; 
Utterback, 1988). With respect to process innovations in particular, eco-
nomic research on technology diffusion has demonstrated the importance of 
differences, or heterogeneity in what Dosi (1989) has termed the incentive 
structures of firms to explain why some firms are quick to adopt a process 
innovation while others fail to do so. For example, some firms are price 
leaders in labor markets, willing to pay a premium in order to attract the 
best quality labor; other firms are willing to accept somewhat lower quality 
labor in order to keep their wages at or below the average paid by their 
competitors. Unless the expected labor savings from a new technology are 
greater than the capital costs of purchasing the equipment, a firm is apt to 
delay making that investment (Metcalfe, 1990; Salter, 1960). Thus, at any 
one point in time, high-wage firms are apt to have a greater incentive than 
low-wage firms to adopt a labor-saving technology. Moreover, there may 
be some minimum threshold scale (Le., volume of output), below which the 
labor savings are too small for it to be profitable for the small firm to invest 
(David, 1975). In addition, there may be scale requirements that make it 
technically infeasible for small firms to adopt it. For example, Mansfield 
(1968) found that for certain innovations, there is a minimum scale at which 
a technology can be profitably used in particular industries. Hence, where 
the scale of investment necessary for a new process technology is very large, 
it can only be undertaken by large firms; small firms will simply lack the 
financial resources or size of revenue stream to make such an investment. 
From this body of research, we learn that the failure of small firms to adopt 
an innovation may be attributable to the heterogeneity of firms with re-
spect to relative factor prices (of labor and technology), profitability, and 
the lumpiness of capital investment. 
A second stream of research on the economics of innovation emphasizes 
differences in firms' technological and organizational competencies, which de-
velop or accumulate over time (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Dosi, 1988; Free-
man, 1988; Nelson and Winter, 1977 and 1982; Rosenberg, 1972 and 1982). 
In this line of inquiry, the problem of imperfect information for learning 
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about new technologies and the importance of accumulated knowledge and 
expertise are given prominence in explaining why some firms are more likely 
to adopt a new technology or to be sources of innovation themselves. Since 
information about the possible uses and relevance of a new technology to 
the firm is difficult to assess (Rosenberg, 1972), firms with more resources 
to devote to scanning the technological environment are likely to be better 
positioned than less well-endowed organizations to identify and exploit a 
new technology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Moreover, firms differ in their 
experience with related technologies. These technological competencies can 
be expected to enhance a firm's capability to make use of other related in-
novations. With respect to process innovations, we would therefore expect 
to find adoption rates to be higher among firms that have demonstrably 
greater technological competencies and resources for scanning the external 
environment. 
A third set of factors identified in some studies are special features of 
economic institutions and inter-firm relationships which explain why - in 
some regions, nations, or among certain groups of firms - the pace of dif-
fusion was found to be more rapid and the rates of adoption much higher. 
For example, with respect to the adoption of hybrid corn among American 
farmers during the 1940s and 1950s, Griliches (1960) observes that the more 
rapid pace of diffusion in certain regions could be attributable to agricul-
tural extension services in a number of different states which were a source 
of innovation for additional improvements. As Nelson and Winter (1977) 
point out, extension service agents have been an especially reliable source of 
information to farmers in these regions. As such, they may very well have 
contributed to the faster speed of adoption observed by Griliches. Similarly, 
Saxonhouse (1974) attributes the rapid rate of diffusion of new techniques 
among Japanese textile manufacturers both to the importance of business 
trade associations serving as a conduit for information and to the accepted 
practice of sharing technical know-how among these firms. The importance 
of information exchange or know-how trading for achieving improvements 
in utilizing a new technology among steel mini-mill producers has also been 
demonstrated by von Hippel (1988). In a world of imperfect information and 
considerable uncertainty about whether and how best to deploy a new tech-
nology, these extra-firm economic institutions and networks of relationships 
among firms can be expected to be particularly important for explaining 
differential rates of adoption. 
In this chapter, we attempt a synthesis of these various theoretical per-
spectives, taking into account the heterogeneity of firms with respect to the 
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cost incentives or profitability of adopting a particular process innovation, 
their organizational capacity for learning and technological competencies, 
and their external linkages to resources for learning about new technological 
developments. With detailed survey data on the technical, economic, and 
organizational characteristics of a large sample of US manufacturing estab-
lishments - all of which are potential adopters of the new technology - we 
are able to operationalize a model for predicting the likelihood of adoption 
of this new technology that simultaneously takes into account all three types 
of influences. 
After accounting for the influence of differences in cost incentives and 
organizational capabilities, we find that a small firm's propensity to adopt 
a process innovation is particularly enhanced by the nature of its linkages 
to external resources for learning about technological developments. These 
results suggest that the well-known scale and size disadvantages of small 
firms for engaging in the risky learning-by-doing process necessary to the 
adoption of new productivity-enhancing technologies may, at least in part, be 
overcome when there are well-developed social networks for sharing expertise 
and acquiring new knowledge among economic actors and institutions. In 
regions or sectors where linkages to such external learning opportunities are 
particularly well-developed, we would expect to find a more rapid rate of 
diffusion of productivity-enhancing process innovations to small firms. 
14.2 The Implications for Small and Large Firms 
of Radical Shifts in the Technological 
Trajectory 
Productivity increases arise both from radical shifts to a new, more efficient 
technology, and from continued, incremental improvement in the way in 
which an existing technology is utilized (Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Ettlie et 
al., 1984). Indeed, for some period of time when both emerging and mature 
process technologies coexist, additional improvements in the mature tech-
niques also occur and frequently accelerate (Harley, 1973). Whether emerg-
ing or mature, every technology has its own associated trajectory (Dosi, 
1982). Incremental learning about how best to use a particular configura-
tion of equipment is the basis for productivity improvements which proceed 
under the same technological regime. Moreover, each firm has its own as-
sociated learning curve. The knowledge derived from marginal adaptations 
of the organization and the technology accumulate over time and becomes 
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part of the informal or tacit know-how - the craft art recognized by many 
observers as a key ingredient that distinguishes high from low productiv-
ity operations employing the same technology (Bohn and Jaikumar, 1986; 
Kusterer, 1978; Pavitt and Patel, 1988; Skinner, 1986). 
New process technologies always involve a change in the ways in which 
products are made - a change in the allocation of tasks, a change in machin-
ery, a change in work methods which may imply retraining, or a change in 
organization. For the firm, there is always some uncertainty about how much 
new knowledge will be necessary and how drastic a change the new config-
uration of equipment and people will entail (Bohn, 1987; Rogers, 1983). If 
these changes require substantially new skills and expertise, then a displace-
ment of the learning curve results, i.e., a discontinuity arises between the 
organizational learning accumulated under the previous production regime 
and that which is needed for the new technology. This could even result in a 
short-term decline in productivity until a certain portion of the new learning 
curve has been traversed as the organization develops the additional exper-
tise needed to more fully exploit the potential advantages inherent in the 
new technological trajectory. 
Certain changes in technology involve such a radical shift away from 
existing techniques that traditional competencies and skills are made obso-
lete (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In the 
case of information technology's application to manufacturing in the form 
of programmable automated (PA) machine tools, the shift to this new tech-
nological regime requires the integration of new science-based knowledge 
of electronics, computers, and software engineering with the accumulated 
tacit knowledge of metal-cutting practices acquired through years of practi-
cal experience; PA also makes some traditional skills obsolete (Kelley, 1989a, 
1989b, 1989c, and 1990a). In order to make this shift to the new trajectory 
successfully, firms have to buy, borrow, or somehow internally develop that 
expertise and integrate it with the relevant traditional practices to match the 
requirements of the emerging system. Because of their size, and hence very 
limited base of resources available to absorb mistakes, small firms are likely 
to face more severe consequences from underestimating the displacement of 
their learning curves. 
Small firms have little organizational slack and, over the long term, are 
more vulnerable to business failure than large firms (Hage, 1980; Hage et 
al., 1989; Scott, 1987). In small manufacturing companies, engineering and 
management resources are limited to a few individuals per plant. For small 
firms to engage in an experimental learning-by-doing process requires the 
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diversion of existing resources from production activities. That may have 
a high opportunity cost. The time that one engineer spends assisting with 
the break-in of any new piece of equipment is time spent away from solving 
other design or production problems. The diversion of this scarce resource 
can cause delays in production which increase costs and may lead to delays 
in shipment and possibly lost orders from customers, contributing to lower 
profits and possibly lower sales. 
By contrast, large, relatively resource-rich organizations can afford to 
embark on a number of experiments with process innovations, only some of 
which may turn out to be successful, without risk to the firm's survival and 
profitability (March, 1981). Related to size is the tendency of large firms to 
have developed specialized capabilities in production engineering and man-
agement. By devoting some specialized resources to improving production 
techniques, large firms have an experience advantage in the kind of "learning 
by doing" that Arrow (1962) identified as a key generator of continued pro-
ductivity improvements under any technological regime. Moreover, because 
of their size advantage, large firms are less vulnerable to any severe conse-
quences (such as their own demise) from making a strategic error (such as 
underestimating start-up time and cost or training time) in deploying any 
single piece of new equipment that does not achieve its expected savings. 
14.3 Economic Limitations on the Technology 
Choices of Small Manufacturing Firms 
As part of a strategy to attain or maintain leadership in one market, the large 
firm may seek to develop proprietary technology which provides a unique cost 
or quality advantage over its competitors. Moreover, when a firm operates in 
a number of markets for which there is a shared technical basis and sufficient 
scale of operations, there is the possibility of achieving a greater synergy from 
exploiting advances in process technology. Hence, being relatively quick to 
use new production techniques can provide such a firm with multiple cost or 
quality advantages over its competitors in several markets at once. 
By contrast, because of the small scale at which they tend to operate, 
small firms have less opportunity to achieve and exploit such technical syn-
ergies. Moreover, even when the incentive to cut costs is great - as is likely 
to be the case with the small manufacturing firm that has expertise in a ma-
ture technology operating in industries. where the prospects for sales growth 
are poor (Le., where sales trends are flat or only growing slowly), and profit 
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margins are slim - the small business owner/manager is of necessity focused 
on the short-term. To him/her, the adoption of a new process technology is 
viewed as being outside the realm of rational choices.[l] Instead, as March 
and Simon (1958) have suggested, management is likely to focus its atten-
tion on familiar problems, attempting to adapt by gaining greater control 
over variable production costs in order to make more efficient use of existing 
equipment and labor within the declining technological paradigm. 
In the short run, such small manufacturing firms' aspirations are mod-
est, being concerned simply with survival. Management may forestall wage 
increases or actually reduce wages. Equipment may be operated more con-
tinuously, sacrificing downtime for preventative maintenance and further de-
pleting the useful life of the capital stock. The manager/owner may be will-
ing to accept lower revenues and even profits in order to be more certain of 
staying in business.[2] 
We might further plausibly assume that there are barriers to exit. Small 
manufacturing firms whose prior success depended on their capacity to ex-
ploit their accumulated experience within an increasing obsolete technolog-
ical paradigm may lack the human or financial resources to absorb the one-
time effort and cost of entering a new line of business. At the same time 
poor growth prospects in their present market niche may not attract en-
try of technologically more advanced firms. Thus, technologically backward 
firms may survive in narrow market niches for protracted periods of time by 
lowering wages and deferring investment, thus retarding the diffusion of new 
production technology and productivity growth.[3] 
14.4 The Importance of External Learning 
Opportunities to the Diffusion of New 
Process Technologies 
Whether or not a firm will adopt a new technology is generally believed to 
be determined by some combination of the relative importance of economic 
incentives for doing so (e.g., to lower costs) and its internal capability to 
undertake an experimental learning-by-doing process. However, with the 
exception of Nelson (1990) and von Hippel (1988), little attention has been 
given to examining how various kinds of linkages with other economic orga-
nizations and institutions matter to the adoption and implementation of in-
novations. The conventional wisdom evident in economic models of diffusion 
is that late adopters learn about the experience of early adopters through 
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osmosis, that is, through informal contact and exchange of know-how among 
managers and engineers employed in different firms. The importance of the 
social context, or the set of linkages the firm has (or has somehow devel-
oped) to external learning opportunities, has hardly been considered in these 
models. 
The proposition that the economic actions undertaken by management 
of a particular firm need to be understood as being affected by its network 
of relations with other firms and economic institutions has long been rec-
ognized by sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and historians 
(cf. Granovetter, 1984). Membership in trade associations, relationships 
with equipment vendors and customers are part of a social nexus in which 
the economic decisions of individual firms are embedded. Moreover, even 
among competitors, inter-firm relationships may take on a special character 
that is of particular importance to the success of a region or to the diffusion 
of innovations. For example, a number of studies on the industrial districts in 
Northern Italy attribute the success of these regional agglomerations in large 
measure to long-established relationships of trust and cooperation among 
technically inter-dependent small and medium sized firms whose economic 
ties are sometimes rivalrous and at other times collaborative - as suppliers 
to or customers of one another (Becattini, 1987 and 1989; Bellandi, 1989; 
Brusco, 1982 and 1986; Lorenz, 1989; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 1989). 
With respect to the learning opportunities that such external resources 
present, some firms are better connected than others, belonging to active, 
service-oriented trade associations, having collaborative relationships with 
their customers, and being part of an industrial community in which know-
how trading with other firms is an accepted practice. We would expect these 
opportunities to be unevenly distributed among firms of different sizes, in-
dustries, and locales. Some firms are poorly linked to external resources as 
a matter of management policy. More commonly, we believe, the presence 
or absence of such linkages reflects historical differences in the evolution of 
economic institutions in particular locales (as seems to be the case of the 
Italian industrial districts) or particular sectors, and in the relative impor-
tance of leading firms in shaping orderly relationships with large networks 
of supplier-firms.[4] 
If learning is the product of experience as Arrow (1962) has argued, then 
for firms to learn about the capabilities of new technologies, they must have 
access to opportunities for gaining trustworthy information about others' 
experience with them. For this to happen, there must be trustworthy insti-
tutions or forums which facilitate the exchange of useful information, help 
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filter out erroneous or irrelevant news, and promote the accumulation of tacit 
know-how within the firm. External resources on which a firm may depend 
to learn about new advances and the experience of others with technology 
include: informal contacts with production managers or engineers in other 
firms; direct contacts with sales representatives of equipment vendors and 
distributors; participation in trade and professional associations; sharing in-
formation with the firm's customers; and reading trade journals, marketing 
newsletters, and brochures for general knowledge about the potential of new 
technologies. Firms may not be persuaded by such published information, 
however, because they have no way of assessing its trustworthiness, but gath-
erings at professional associations or industry trade shows may enable users 
and potential users of a new technology to meet and examine the latest 
equipment offered by vendors and exchange practical tips with other users 
about a new technology's limitations as well as its capabilities. Such linkages 
may be particularly important for explaining why some small firms adopt 
a process innovation while others with apparently similar characteristics do 
not. 
Through their service activities, capital equipment manufacturers and 
distributors are also an agency through which best-practice techniques for 
utilizing a new technology may be taught (Ettlie and Rubenstein, 1980; 
Leonard-Barton, 1988).[5] These equipment manufacturers have been known 
to sometimes customize the design of new systems for lead users, adapting 
the innovation to the customer's specific production requirements and pro-
viding intensive follow-up support services during the initial implementation 
phase (Collis, 1988; von Hippel, 1988). They do so in anticipation of win-
ning a large, loyal customer or as part of an experimental developmental 
effort which will result in improvements in the design of future generations 
of the technology. When this user dedicates some of its own organizational 
resources toward that collaborative effort, then it is also likely to engender 
organizational expertise within the user-firm as a result of close interactions 
of key personnel involved in such working relationships. These types of con-
tacts are known to occur particularly in the early phases of the development 
of a new technology, are sometimes reserved for customers that purchase ex-
pensive systems, or are made available to large users from which the vendor 
expects a hefty order.[6] 
Another important learning opportunity may arise from a firm's rela-
tionships to the businesses that purchase its products. Kelley and Har-
rison's (1990) research on subcontracting relationships suggest that many 
firms choose suppliers because of their specialized capabilities. Such business 
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customers with which a small firm has some special relationship could be an 
important source both for learning about new technological developments 
and about how to use an innovation. 
Previous studies have documented the ebb and flow of relations of trust 
and collaboration between firms and their business customers (Cusamano, 
1985; Dore, 1986; Kenney and Florida, 1989; Minato, 1986; Sato, 1983; 
Trevor and Christie, 1988). Close relations between a firm and a few cus-
tomers can be both beneficial and inhibiting to the adoption of new produc-
tion technology. On the one hand, a close collaborative relationship to one 
or a few customers may open up the possibility of gaining favored status, 
and the benefits of technical and financial assistance that flow from that 
relationship. On the other hand, too close a dependence on a few customers 
may make small firms more vulnerable to price-cutting pressures and to fluc-
tuations in customers' demands. Under pressure to cut costs, or faced with 
greater volatility in orders for its products, firms caught in such close rela-
tionships could have such small profit margins as to lack the resources and 
incentive to invest in new technology. 
14.5 Programmable Automation: A Comparison 
of Adopters and Non-adopters of New 
Process Technology 
Programmable automation (PA) in the form of numerically controlled (NC) 
and computerized numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools and flexi-
ble manufacturing systems (FMS), interconnecting such tools by automatic 
transfer, has been hailed as signalling a fundamental techno-economic para-
digm shift which promises to greatly reduce the economies of scale that have 
driven the design and organization of manufacturing since the beginning 
of the industrial revolution (Freeman and Perez, 1986; Hirschhorn, 1984; 
Kaplinsky, 1984; Perez, 1986; Piore and Sabel, 1984). Since instructions 
controlling the operation of programmable machines can be incorporated 
into easily altered software rather than unalterable hardware, one piece of 
manufacturing hardware is adaptable to many different products which can 
be made in both small and large volume in a wide variety of industries that 
require the shaping and cutting of metal parts. 
To date, PA has been applied mainly to the precision metal-cutting op-
erations of turning, milling, grinding, and boring - operations important 
in the manufacture of a diverse range of products, from aircraft engines 
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and industrial machinery to coffee grinders and lawn mowers. Machining 
is a "batch" production process, in which products are made in small to 
medium-size lots - too small to benefit from the earlier form of fixed-cycle 
hard automation. By 1982, the combined output of NC/CNC machines from 
six of the major machine-tool producing countries (USA, Japan, Federal Re-
public of Germany (FRG), France, Italy, and the UK) comprised two-thirds 
of the total value of production of all metal-cutting machines (Edquist and 
Jacobsson, 1988, p. 26). 
This technology is not unique to particular product lines and appears to 
be equally technically and economically feasible for large and small firms. 
Single machines can be installed one at a time and used alongside conven-
tional, non-programmable machines. Since the mid-1970s, improvements in 
the technology - particularly the incorporation of microprocessors - have 
made it easier to use, while machine productivity has increased at the same 
time as purchase costs have come down (Edquist and Jacobsson, 1988). 
In what follows, we draw on a national survey of US manufacturing 
establishments completed in 1987 to examine adoption rates of PA in a 
range of establishment and firm sizes and to evaluate the significance of three 
sets of factors for distinguishing how adopters differ from non-adopters of 
the technology: cost and profitability incentives, organizational resources 
and technical capabilities, and linkages to external resources and sources for 
learning about technological developments. 
14.5.1 Data description and methods 
The data we employ come from a national sample of establishments be-
longing to twenty-one manufacturing industries, at the 3-digit level of the 
US Standard Industrial Classification scheme. Following the convention of 
the US Census of Manufactures, establishments in the sampling frame were 
grouped into the following size categories: fewer than 20, 20 to 49, 50 to 
99, 100 to 249, and 250 or more, employees. In order to ensure a sufficient 
number of cases within each size stratum, establishments were dispropor-
tionately randomly sampled by strata in order to yield a data set with an 
equal number of establishments from each stratum. Since the distribution 
of establishments by employment size is highly skewed, with fewer than 10 
percent of all plants employing 100 or more workers in the industries studied, 
this procedure guarantees a sufficient number of large size plants to allow 
for variation among them in the use of technology, type of product market. 
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All population estimates are weighted averages, which were constructed 
by weighting each observation by the inverse of the probability of selection 
from its sampling stratum. The production managers in these plants were 
surveyed between October of 1986 and March of 1987 (Kelley and Brooks, 
1988). All told, 1,015 plant managers were successfully interviewed by mail, 
yielding a 50 percent response rate.· Half of the non-respondents were then 
contacted by telephone and asked questions which, apart from their substan-
tive value, confirmed the absence of response bias in the mail survey. 
The twenty-one industries were chosen because they account for the great 
majority of machining activity in the US economy.[7] Twenty-five percent of 
all US manufacturing workers in 1986 were employed in these industries. The 
data base includes information on the size of the parent company (as mea-
sured by corporate-wide employment in the USA) and considerable detail 
on organizational, technical, and economic characteristics of each plant.[8] 
All sample establishments use machine tools for some aspect of production 
operations in their plants. Hence, they are all potential adopters of PA 
technology. 
At the time of the survey, fifty-seven percent of the sample plants had 
not yet installed even one programmable machine. As of 1987, most firms 
that had failed to adopt programmable automation seem unlikely candidates 
for doing so at some time in the near future. Despite improvements in 
the technology that have made it easier to use and less costly to install, 
two-thirds of non-adopters perceive the payback period associated with the 
introduction of PA as being too long to justify any investment. 
These firms' unwillingness to invest in programmable automation seems 
to be related to a general reluctance (and possibly lack of financial resources) 
for making investments to improve their capital stock. The average invest-
ment in new equipment of any kind for firms that had not purchased any PA 
at the time of our survey was less than one-third the amount invested per 
employee by PA users in the same year.[9] Over the previous five year period 
(from 1982-1986), during which time more than half of all programmable ma-
chine tool installations presently in use in the United States were purchased, 
less than one-third of the enterprises that made no such purchases ever even 
considered that alternative. Moreover, in 1987, only 18 percent of those 
that had not invested in PA said that they had any plans for purchasing this 
equipment in 1988 or 1989. 
In the previous section of the chapter we described how three different 
sets of factors could be expected to affect the likelihood of a firm adopt-
ing a new process technology such as PA: cost and profitability incentives, 
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organizational resources and technical competencies, and external linkages. 
The majority of PA users (71 percent) have some programmable machines 
that were first installed more than five years ago, with 10 percent of PA-
users having at least some programmable machines still in use that were 
purchased more than 10 years ago. However, eighty-five percent of PA-using 
plants have at least one machine from the latest micro-processor generation 
of the technology - with computerized numerical controls - which was first 
introduced only in the late 1970s. We cannot know from these data the 
changes in firm and establishment characteristics that may have accompa-
nied or followed the adoption of programmable machines.[10] Our analysis 
is thus limited to a comparison of the ways in which PA adopters differ from 
non-adopters at what must be understood to be an intermediate stage in the 
diffusion of this technology. 
We estimated a binomial logistic regression model, with the dependent 
variable, PA, defined equal to 1 if the production manager at the establish-
ment reported there were any programmable machines in use, and equal to 
o if no programmable tools were present. Technical definitions for all inde-
pendent variables can be found in Appendix Table l./..A1. Complete data 
on all variables needed to estimate the model were available for 75 percent 
of the cases in the sample. 
14.5.2 Factors distinguishing PA adopters from non-adopters 
Cost and profitability 
Five variables representing cost and profitability factors were hypothesized 
to be important inducements to the firm to adopt programmable automa-
tion. Relative labor costs, the degree to which production operations at a 
plant were dependent on machining skills, the presence of a union, the scale 
of machining operations at a plant, and product markets with a high re-
quirement for "flexibility" are all expected to be important economic factors 
favoring the adoption of PA. 
In previous research on programmable automation, managers have re-
ported that reductions in direct labor costs or increased productivity are 
the major expected gains from adopting this process innovation (Ayres and 
Miller, 1982; Hicks, 1983; Parsons et al., 1984; Rosenthal, 1984). As a form 
of automation that is expected to lead to productivity gains (Le., increases 
in output per person hour), we would expect the cost-cutting impetus for 
adopting PA to be the greatest in establishments where machining labor 
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costs are relatively high. Thus, PA is more likely to have been adopted in 
plants with relatively high wages for machining occupations. 
Another economic factor expected to favor PA adoption is the relative 
importance of machining skills to the overall production activities of the es-
tablishment. The greater the share of all production workers in occupations 
requiring these skills, the more likely it is that management will seek ways 
of reducing costs and improving productivity within that operation. Where 
machining skills are of minor importance to the overall production activities, 
management is less likely to make an effort to automate that process with 
computer-controlled machinery. 
There is some disagreement in the literature as to how we might expect 
unionization to affect investment in a labor-saving process innovation such 
as programmable automation. Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that when 
a plant is unionized, management is more likely to pay attention to weed-
ing out inefficient practices and to streamline production, suggesting that 
PA might be adopted more rapidly in unionized establishments. Similarly, 
Clark's comparison (1980) of union and non-union firms in the cement in-
dustry suggests that management is more likely to introduce labor-saving 
technology in order to improve productivity when collective-bargaining gov-
erns the firm's relationship to its employees. However, research by Kochan 
(1985) and Schmenner (1982) suggests that when a unionized plant is part 
of a multi-plant enterprise, corporate management's investment decisions are 
apt to be informed by other industrial relations policy considerations. In his 
analysis of Conference Board data on corporate patterns of investment in 
plant and equipment, Kochan finds that unionized establishments received 
much less investment from the parent company than their non-union sister 
plants (controlling for age of the plant). Schmenner's research on the For-
tune 500 shows a similar pattern of withholding investment from unionized 
plants. If corporate (multi-plant) strategic considerations are found to domi-
nate the union effect, we would expect to find the adoption ofPA technology 
to be less likely to occur when a plant is unionized, or for there to be no 
significant impact from unionization at all. 
The concept and measurement of scale is somewhat ambiguous in studies 
of innovation. [11] In this analysis, we include a variable that controls for the 
effect of scale in the sense of size of machining operations at a plant. With 
respect to machine tools, we would argue that the smaller the number of tools 
in use at a plant (and thus the smaller the scale of machining operations), 
the more risky it would be for the firm to adopt even one programmable 
machine. The potentially disruptive consequences from introducing the new 
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technology are greater, the fewer the number of machines in use. Moreover, 
for firms with a plant that has few tools, the cost of replacing anyone of 
them represents a much larger share of its total capital investment in machine 
tools than would be the case for firms having plants with larger stocks of 
machines. Similar to David (1975), we would argue that the cost of adopting 
a single programmable machine may be too high for firms operating at too 
small a scale of machining. Thus, for smaller scale machining operations, 
management may find the adoption of PA to be a much more risky and 
lumpy investment and therefore be unwilling to adopt it, even though it 
may be profitable to do so. For that reason, we would expect the chances 
that management will have adopted PA to be less, the smaller the scale of 
machining operations at a plant. 
A number of students of industrial change (Carlsson, 1989; Piore and 
Sabel, 1984; Kern and Schumann, 1984 and 1987) have argued that manu-
facturing firms face increasingly volatile and uncertain product markets for 
their goods. In discussions of the advantages of programmable technologies 
for small firms, PA has been touted as being especially well-suited to meet 
the high technical flexibility requirements of firms operating in such environ-
ments, specializing in manufacturing a diverse array of parts or products in 
very small batches (Dosi, 1988; Kern and Schumann, 1984; Pi ore and Sabel, 
1984). Because programmable machines can be re-instructed for each change 
in product, a firm that operates in such product markets will have a greater 
incentive to adopt the technology since it lowers the costs of switching from 
one product to another. Hence, establishments with high flexibility require-
ments should find PA a more attractive investment than plants without such 
high switching costs.[12] 
Internal resources and technical competencies 
Firm size is a proxy measure for the extent to which an organization may 
be said to be resource-rich. Large firms have multiple production sites and 
a larger base of experience with various technologies that can be brought to 
bear in adopting any particular process innovation. The larger the firm, the 
more likely it is to employ professional staff at the corporate level with re-
sponsibility for providing technical expertise to production managers at any 
one of its plants. At anyone point in time, larger firms can marshal greater 
resources more rapidly than smaller firms to deal with unexpected problems 
in implementing a new technology. Because of this superior adaptive capac-
ity, we would expect that the larger the firm the more capable it is (in terms 
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of resource capacity) to make the necessary adjustments in its operations to 
accommodate to a process innovation such as PA, and the more likely it will 
be to have adopted PA in plants for which the technology is suitable, i.e., 
those using machine tools in production operations. 
Information technology has many applications. In manufacturing, com-
puters are used for monitoring and planning functions, such as process plan-
ning and production scheduling, quality control and materials flow monitor-
ing, and inventory control. That a plant has adopted any of these informa-
tion technology applications would indicate greater formalization of man-
agement systems of information and control. Such a change may involve 
only a shift from written record-keeping and inventory procedures to com-
puterization, or it may involve a more radical shift from an informal organic 
organizational structure to one with a more formal structure and system of 
control. In either case, the use of information technology in these functions 
suggests a greater technological sophistication (and by implication,· an en-
hanced organizational capacity) to exploit PA. Although there may be no 
technical interdependence between the use of IT in these applications and PA 
(as there would be with computer-aided design), it is a complementary tech-
nological competency that should facilitate the adoption of programmable 
machines. We would therefore expect an establishment with such advanced 
information technology capabilities in monitoring and planning functions to 
be more likely to have adopted PA. 
Linkages to external resources 
As mentioned earlier, there are multiple external resources by which a firm 
can acquir~ knowledge about a new technology's capabilities. These can be 
distinguished by the type oflinkage (whether it has a social or interpersonal 
dimension or not) and by the source of information. 
Stories in trade journals and mailings from equipment vendors and their 
distributors are external sources for learning about technological develop-
ments in the form of written media. Thirty-eight percent of all production 
managers surveyed considered linkage to this channel of information flow to 
be very important for learning about new technology. Nevertheless, by itself, 
we do not expect this kind of linkage to external resources to be a sufficiently 
reliable means for learning about technology. We would therefore not expect 
to find any difference between PA users and non-adopters with respect to 
their reliance on such written sources of communication. 
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Know-how trading in the form of informal exchanges of information 
through conversations with production managers and engineers outside of 
the establishment (Le., in other companies or in other plants of the same 
company) was the most common external resource cited by respondents as 
a very important way to learn about new technology. This type of exchange 
is of course recognizable as the casual individualized form of learning by 
osmosis which Stoneman (1980) assumes to be the major channel through 
which new technological expertise diffuses. In our formulation of the set of 
inter-firm linkages that distinguish PA adopters from non-adopters, we have 
the opportunity to test how important this kind of informal exchange is rel-
ative to other, more structured, collective forms of information exchange. 
Following Stoneman and von Hippel, we do expect to find a positive effect 
of know-how trading on the likelihood of adoption of PA, ceteris paribus. 
Trade associations and professional technical societies provide an avenue 
for managers and engineers from member organizations to meet and discuss 
problems of common concern. In contrast to individualized know-how trad-
ing, demonstrations of new equipment at meetings of such associations is a 
highly structured, collective way of learning about technological problems 
and capabilities. At such events, groups of managers and engineers with 
common problems and issues have an opportunity to exchange information 
with each other and to compare the features of equipment offered by different 
vendors. We would expect that being connected to such organizations and 
participating in such events affords members a more intensive and compar-
ative learning experience than may occur through individualized know-how 
trading. Managers and engineers of firms who participate in such activities 
are likely to be better informed and to have a broader set of knowledge-
able contacts to whom they can turn to discuss technological issues. For 
these reasons, we would expect firms with such linkages to have a higher 
propensity to adopt advanced manufacturing technologies such as PA. 
Direct contact with sales representatives from equipment vendors or their 
distributors (independent of contact through trade shows) is another struc-
tured way of learning about new technology. Unlike the case of consumer 
products, where sales persons are not expected to know much about the 
products they sell, sales representatives for industrial equipment products 
such as PA are expected to have some expertise with the technology, if only 
to be capable of explaining how it can be used and what the expected bene-
fits are from using it. Hence, they may be an additional source of expertise 
that managers can draw upon in deciding to adopt and use new technology. 
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Another way in which expertise is transferred from one firm to another is 
through a firm's contacts with its customers. Eighty-eight percent of all US 
metal-working establishments make products using machine tools for sale to 
other manufacturing firms. More than three-fourths of these say that they 
have business customers for whom they make machined parts or products on 
special order and from whom they receive technical information and engi-
neering assistance in making these special parts or products. Such a transfer 
of technical information suggests a degree of dependency between the two 
firms that could provide the occasion for other exchanges of technical ex-
pertise that may be particularly important in augmenting the capabilities of 
small firms to adopt a new technology. More generally, we hypothesize that 
firms with such close connections to their business customers are also more 
likely to be able to draw on these customers for assistance in implementing 
a new technology. For these reasons, firms that have such an information 
sharing relationship with their customers will (we expect) be more likely to 
adopt PA. 
14.6 Findings 
The results of our estimating procedure are shown in Table 14.1. Ten of 
the thirteen variables in the model are significant in predicting which es-
tablishments are likely to have adopted PA by 1987. As expected, cost 
and profitability incentives are important. In addition, plants that are part 
of firms with greater technical and organizational resources are much more 
likely to be PA users. Finally, establishments with certain kinds of linkages 
to external learning opportunities have an enhanced chance of adopting PA 
technology that can permit the small firm to overcome the liabilities of small 
scale and its lack of adequate internal resources. 
Cost incentives 
Both the cost of labor and the degree to which the overall production pro-
cess at a plant is dependent on machining skills are significant predictors of 
PA adoption. Independent of wages, we do not find that unionization has 
significantly affected management's deployment of programmable machines. 
Figure 14.1 shows a simulation of the predicted probabilities of adopting 
PA for the typical US machining establishment for different wage rates, with 
all other variables in the model held constant at their sample means.[13] 
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Percent of production workforce in machining occupations 
(All other variables set to sample means) 
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Figure 14.1. Probability of PA adoption by average hourly wage for ma-
chining occupations at the plant. 
US$20.00 per hour), the probability that there will be at least some PA 
tools in a plant is quite high (p > 0.66) . At less than one-half the average 
hourly wage (about US$5.00 an hour), fewer than 3 out of 10 such low-wage 
employers will have introduced any PA. 
The degree of machining skill dependency is a technical attribute of pro-
duction that is expected to vary with the kinds and mix of products be-
ing manufactured at a plant and the extent to which machining operations 
needed for these products are performed in their entirety within the plant 
or, in part, contracted out to other firms.[14] The typical manufacturing 
establishment engaged in machining activity is very dependent on the skills 
of workers specializing in these operations. On average, about 77 percent of 
all production workers in the manufacturing plants studied are employed in 
machining occupations. In Figure 14.2, we see that the less the manufactur-
ing process at a plant depends on a work force with specialized machining 
skills the lower the probability of PA adoption. For example, as the degree 
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Percent of production workforce in machin ing occupations 
(All other variables set to sample means) 
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Figure 14.2. Probability of PA adoption by degree of machining skills 
dependency at the plant. 
of skill dependency falls from 75 to 50 percent of all produ,ction workers, the 
predicted probability of PA adoption is reduced at about the same rate, by 
one-third, from p = 0.45 to p = 0.30 (again with all other variables held 
constant at their sample means). 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that when management 
faces higher labor costs and has a greater dependency on particular skills, 
there will be a greater incentive to adopt such a labor-saving technology 
as programmable automation. The higher wages we find associated with 
PA use may in part reflect an increase in the skill demands of machining 
occupations associated with the introduction of the new technology. Such 
cause and effect relationships cannot be sorted out with the available data. 
Hence, we cannot determine the magnitude of the incentive effect that high 
labor costs may have served to initially induce management to adopt PA. 
More than one-third of all machining establishments have high flexibility 
requirements, making a diverse (50 or more) array of parts/products in very 
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small batch sizes (with 50 percent or more of total machining output in 
batches of fewer than 10 units). Although the direction of the effect of 
high flexibility requirements is as predicted (indicating a tendency to adopt 
PA), these demands are not sufficiently strong, in and of themselves, to 
significantly affect the firm's propensity to use PA tools. 
Scale (or the size) of machining operations across the wide range of indus-
tries studied varies from plants that employ only one machine tool to those 
utilizing up to 1,500 different machines. Our results show that plants with 
smaller scale machining operations (as measured by the number of tools) 
have thus far been deterred from adopting PA. This is illustrated in Figure 
1..1.3, which also shows that the marginal effect of differences in scale on 
the probability of PA adoption are relatively small. For example, establish-
ments with 50 tools have 5 times the scale of machining operations as plants 
in which only 10 tools are deployed, yet the change in predicted probabilities 
of adopting PA increases from p = 0.44 for plants with 10 tools to only p 
= 0.54 for plants with 50 tools, an increase of less than 25 percent. Even 
for very small scale machining operations, the probability of PA adoption is 
quite high, ceteris paribus. A plant with only 20 tools is nearly as likely to 
have at least one PA tool as it is to rely exclusively on non-programmable 
machine tool technology (p = 0.49). 
Internal resources: the importance of firm size 
At plants where information technology is utilized to support a system of 
control and production planning, there is a significantly greater probabil-
ity that PA will also be deployed. Independent of the scale of machining 
operations, cost incentives, and the technological sophistication in related 
IT applications at a given plant, we find the size of the parent company's 
organizational resources to be a significant predictor of PA adoption. 
As shown in Figure 14.4, for the very small single-plant firm with fewer 
than 20 employees, the chances that there will be even one programmable 
machine are no better than about 40 percent. For firms with more than 
10,000 employees nationwide, we are practically certain (p ~ 0.96) of finding 
at least one programmable machine in its plants (all other things being 
equal). Even for the plants belonging to moderately large firms with about 
500 employees throughout the United States, the chances of there being no 
PA tools at the plant are quite low (p = 0.17). 
Small firms may be invariably small scale, but the converse is not al-
ways true: large firms do not invariably have large scale operations.[15] 
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Figure 14.3. Probability of PA adoption by scale of machining operations 
at the plant. 
When we compare the predicted probabilities for the marginal effects of firm 
size to that of machining scale at a plant (Figure 14.5), it is apparent that 
differences in firm size (taken as indicative of differences in organizational ca-
pabilities) are far more important than differences in machining scale per se 
in explaining differential adoption rates among establishments. Small firms 
with invariably small scale machining operations are, as expected, least likely 
to have adopted any PA tools. 
How much do external learning opportunities affect the chances of PA adop-
tion for small firms? 
When the production manager reports that he has linkages - which sup-
port learning about new technology - to equipment vendors, to industry or 
trade associations, and to his customers, we are more likely to find some 
programmable machines in use at the plant he manages. But the causality 
is more complex than we had imagined.[16] 
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Figure 14.4. Probability of PA adoption by size of parent company. 
Informal, individualized know-how trading may be the most common 
sort of linkage to external resources, but it is not a statistically significant 
predictor of PA adoption. Moreover, relying solely on written sources of 
information independent of any personal contact with equipment vendors, 
distributors, other users, or in isolation from trade shows and demonstrations 
at professional associations actually reduces the likelihood of PA adoption . 
In addition, when a firm sells its machining output to other firms but has no 
special order customers willing to share technical information, it's chances 
of adopting PA are significantly reduced . Linkages that actually reduce the 
chances of PA adoption have a passive and asocial character to them. 
The kind of highly structured and social linkage to other potential adopt-
ers and new technology manufacturers that occurs in meetings of industry 
and professional associations is a significant predictor of PA adoption. More-
over, independent of the contacts that are made at such group settings, fur-
ther direct contacts with sales representatives from equipment vendors and 
their distributors are another external linkage that significantly increases the 
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Figure 14.5. Probability of PA adoption by machining scale at plant and 
by size of parent company. 
likelihood of PA adoption. Firms with special-order customers who provide 
detailed technical information about their orders have significantly greater 
chance of adopting PA than firms without such close relationships to their 
customers. Along with informal know-how trading - with it's positive but 
insignificant impact on the likelihood of adoption - this set of linkages can 
be best described as having an essentially social and active quality, involving 
direct interpersonal interchange or contact with outside resources. 
In order to evaluate the combined effects of those various external link-
ages that we have identified as active and social from those we have identified 
as largely passive and asocial in nature on the likelihood of PA adoption for 
firms of different sizes (and hence different internal resources and capabilities 
for undertaking technological change), we computed the predicted probabil-
ities for the average plant in each of four different firm size categories: firms 
with fewer than 20; 20 to 99; 100 to 499; and over 500 employees. The 
scenario identified as indicative of a "passive/asocial" set of external link-
ages refers to the case in which reliance on external resources is limited 
to written media, i.e., brochures, ads, and newsletters, and to firms that 
sell their machining products to some other firm but have no special order 
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Table 14.2. Estimates of the importance of external learning opportunities 
to the probability of PA adoption in plants of different size firms. 
Size of 
parent company 
Firms with <20 employees 
Firms with 20-99 employees 
Firms with 100-499 employees 
Firms with 500 or more employees 
Notes: 











(1) For both scenarios, the plants of these firms are assumed to sell output from the ma-
chining process to some other firm. 
(2) "Passive/asocial linkages" refers to those situations in which management depends 
only on written media (newsletters, brochures) as an outside source of information about 
technological developments, is not an active participant in industry or professional asso-
ciation meetings, does not rely on know-how trading with managers or engineers outside 
the plant, does not depend on contacts with sales representatives from equipment vendors 
or their distributors to learn about new technology, and does not have business customers 
who share any technical information or expertise. 
(3) A plant with "Active/social linkages" is one where management is an active partic-
ipant in industry or professional association meetings, relies on know-how trading with 
managers or engineers outside the plant, depends on sales representatives from equipment 
vendors or distributors to learn about new technology, and has special order customers 
who provide technical information and expertise. 
(4) Probabilities are estimated by setting variables measuring one type of linkage (e.g., 
"active/social") equal to one and those measuring the other type of linkage (e.g., "pas-
sive/asocial") equal to zero. For each estimate, all other variables in the model are set 
equal to the group mean for establishments in that firm size category. 
customers who share technical information with them. To have "active" and 
"social" linkages means that plant management does not rely solely on writ-
ten media independent of various personal contacts with sales representatives 
from equipment vendors or their distributors, and with other users. More-
over, management with "active/social" linkages participates in meetings of 
trade and professional associations where demonstrations of new technology 
occur, has additional direct contacts with vendors, and has sufficiently close 
relationships to some of its special order customers, such that some technical 
information sharing regularly occurs between the two. 
The results of these simulation are shown in Table 1.{2.[17] For all 
plants but those attached to the largest firms (~ 500 employees), we find 
that when management has "active/social" linkages to external resources for 
learning about new technological developments the chances of PA adoption 
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are substantially higher than those plants with only "passive/asocial" types 
of linkages. "Active/social" linkages raise the chances of PA adoption the 
most among plants belonging to the smallest size firms. For the very smallest 
firms with fewer than 20 employees that have only "passive/asocial" linkages 
to various external resources, the chances of PA adoption are quite low, less 
than 1 in 5 (p = 0.18). With "active/social" linkages through which the 
exchange of technical expertise and learning among firms is facilitated, the 
conditional probability of PA adoption increases by more than 250 percent 
(to p = 0.65). For small firms with 20 to 99 employees, "active/social" 
linkages to external resources outside the firm increase the chances of PA 
adoption over firms with "passive/asocial" linkages from less than 3 in 10 (p 
= 0.29) to more than 3 in 4 (p = 0.77). Even for medium-sized firms with 
100 to 499 employees, we find that such "active/social" linkages to resources 
external to the firm augment the chances of PA adoption by a substantial 
margin. 
When the very smallest size firms (with fewer than 20 employees) are 
very well-connected to all four of the "active/social" linkages for which we 
have identified a positive impact on PA adoption, these external economic 
advantages compensate for much of the diseconomies of small size and scale. 
Indeed, the chances of PA adoption for such well-connected small firms actu-
ally exceed those estimated for the typical plant of medium-sized firms that 
are nearly 10 times as large (with between 100 and 499 employees) but have 
only "passive/asocial" linkages to external sources of expertise. 
14.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have argued that a combination of three sets of fac-
tors explains which establishments are likely to have adopted programmable 
automation. Cost and profitability incentives (or deterrents), the internal 
resources and accumulated technical competencies of the firm, and the firm's 
linkages to external sources of expertise for learning about the new technol-
ogy's capabilities and limitations are all important in predicting PA use. 
As of 1987, we find that small-scale, small-size firms are the least likely to 
have introduced any PA tools. Small firms lack the internal resources and 
operate at too small a scale of production to generate the kind of internal 
synergies across a number of product markets, that is, the economies of 
scope, enjoyed by large diversified companies. Yet as we have shown, the 
deterring effect of small scale and the lack of internal resources (small size) 
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for engaging in the kind of experimentallearning-by-doing process necessary 
to make the shift to the new technology's learning curve can be overcome 
when certain external resources are available to supplement the small firm's 
limited capabilities. Without the kinds of connections to trade associations, 
to equipment manufacturers, and to special order customers - which help to 
transfer technical know-how and therefore underwrite the risks of adopting 
a new process technology - our results would suggest that the isolated small 
firm (i.e., characterized by passive/asocial linkages to external resources) 
that relies wholly on traditional techniques is not likely to even attempt the 
necessary retooling of machines and people. Instead, we would expect such 
firms to pursue a strategy of lower wages and more intensive use of aging 
capital for the short to intermediate term. That strategy may permit these 
firms to continue to exist for a while longer as long as they do not face much 
of a threat from new entrants to their markets who are more techhologically 
advanced. 
There are two ways to consider the implications of these findings for pol-
icy. One could argue that the greatest obstacle to diffusion is simply the 
tradition-bound firms' tenacity, i.e., their stubborn commitment to continu-
ing to do business as usual as long as they can. Hence, a policy designed to 
more aggressively drive them out of business would presumably hasten the 
process of diffusion. If there is no alternative use for the capital of such firms 
and if the work force would need to be substantially retrained in order to be 
productively employed elsewhere in the economy, a policy designed to force 
the closure of these plants could result in a net social welfare loss. Even 
though the firms that remained in business would be more efficient than 
those that were encouraged to close, such a policy may be more costly to so-
ciety than allowing these firms to continue to produce, albeit less efficiently. 
Alternatively, one could argue that the absence of strong "active/social" 
linkages to external resources for learning about new technology develop-
ments among small firms in different sectors and locales is what is limiting 
the more widespread and rapid diffusion of new manufacturing technologies 
such as programmable automation. 
In certain other national economies, the most well-known example being 
that of Japan, these linkages are reported to be far more common, helping 
to diminish the disparities in technological sophistication between large and 
small firms that might otherwise prevail.[18] National economies with in-
stitutional arrangements that are generally supportive of such ties among 
many manufacturing firms may thus be more successful in sustaining their 
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technological leadership in various markets in this period of transition to a 
new techno-economic paradigm. 
In the United States, technology assistance programs to manufacturing 
firms now operate in more than thirty states (Shapira, 1990). Such programs 
can provide a trustworthy source for connecting potential PA users to equip-
ment vendors or their distributors. But technology assistance programs that 
emphasize one-on-one assistance to small companies are in danger of ignor-
ing the problem of weak linkages. These activities cannot substitute for the 
collective learning experience that is more likely to occur through interac-
tions among members of the same trade or professional association. Nor can 
these agencies substitute for the absence of special customers with whom 
a small business can develop a collaborative relationship that not only is a 
resource for learning about technology but may also provide some degree of 
stability of demand for its products. The creation of these kinds of strong, 
supportive linkages of an "active/social" character should be an objective of 
public policies designed to foster modernization among small manufacturers. 
Acknowledgments 
Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at a research seminar in the Science 
Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex and at the International Conference 
on Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behaviour in the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis. We are grateful to Christopher Freeman and Robert 
Ayres for providing us with the opportunities to tryout our ideas in these forums. 
For their careful criticisms and many helpful suggestions for revisions, we would 
especially like to acknowledge Alice H. Amsden, Kim B. Clark, Paul A. David, 
Peter Doeringer, Bennett Harrison, Susan Helper, Steve Klepper, F. Michael Sherer, 
and Todd Watkins. Research assistance was ably provided by Lan Xue and Todd 
Watkins. For Japanese translations, we would like to thank Toshihiro Toyoshima. 
The original data collection effort for this research was supported by grants from the 
National Science Foundation (Award No. SES-8520174) and the US Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment (Contract No. 633-2470-0). 
Notes 
[1] For the small firm, the economic environment so conditions these choices, 
that as Simon (1957) put it, the firm's "planning horizon" becomes "sharply 
limit [ed] ." 
[2] Howland's research (1988) on plant closings provides some support for our view 
of small manufacturing firms as facing a severely constrained set of investment 
alternatives and strategic choices. For example, she finds that when faced with 
the same poor economic prospects, small, single-plant firms are much less likely 
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than branch plants of large firms to close, preferring instead to stay in business 
at a reduced level of operations and profits. 
[3] Insofar as large firms that may themselves be quite sophisticated in their use of 
advanced manufacturing technologies continue to rely on suppliers with these 
characteristics, their ability to compete against firms with a technologically 
advanced supplier chain is also diminished. 
[4] For example, nearly all researchers see the collaborative production networks in 
Japan as being led by great industrial conglomerates (Cusamano, 1985; Dore, 
1986; Florida and Kenney, 1989; Freeman, 1988; Johnson, 1982). 
[5] See Guile (1986), for a discussion of the possibility that distributors, rather 
than manufacturers of the new technology themselves, will play an increasing 
role in disseminating such knowledge and the possibility of market failure when 
the conditions for appropriating returns from such marketing activity are very 
weak. 
[6] Such close connections to equipment vendors may not be equally available to all 
potential adopters of a process innovation. There is little incentive for vendors 
or distributors to provide individualized tutoring to the myriad of small firms 
that have not adopted any new technology and are individually likely to make 
only a small investment. Services available from makers of new equipment or 
their distributors may thus be a very imperfect mechanism for accommodating 
many small, weakly linked firms to a new technological trajectory. 
[7] The industries surveyed include: nonferrous foundries (SIC 336), cutlery, hand 
tools, and hardware (SIC 342), heating equipment and plumbing fixtures (SIC 
343), screw machine products (SIC 345), metal forgings and stampings (SIC 
346), ordnance and accessories, not elsewhere classified (SIC 348), miscella-
neous fabricated metal products (SIC 349), engines and turbines (SIC 351), 
farm and garden machinery and equipment (SIC 352), construction and related 
machinery (SIC 353), metalworking machinery and equipment (SIC 354), spe-
cial industrial machinery, excluding metalworking (SIC 355), general industrial 
machinery and equipment (SIC 356), miscellaneous machinery, excluding elec-
trical (SIC 359), electrical industrial apparatus (SIC 362), motor vehicles and 
equipment (SIC 371), aircraft and parts (SIC 372), guided missiles and space 
vehicles (SIC 376), engineering and scientific instruments (SIC 381), measuring 
and controlling instruments (SIC 382), jewelry, silverware, and plateware (SIC 
391). Fifty percent of the sample establishments were in SIC 354 and SIC 359. 
[8] These data have been analyzed to examine the morphology of subcontracting 
relations (Kelley and Harrison, 1990; Harrison and Kelley, 1990), productivity 
in the use of PA (Kelley, 1990b; Kelley and Xue, 1990), and the determinants 
of skill-upgrading approaches to job design and training opportunities (Kelley, 
1989a, 1989b, 1989c, and 1990a). 
[9] In 1986, an average of US$6,265.51 per employee was invested in new equip-
ment among establishments with programmable machines, compared to the 
US$1,972.40 per employee in establishments that had no PA technology. 
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[10] However, from responses to questions asked of those who were planning to in-
stall PA in 1988-89, it seems clear that the introduction ofthis new technology 
is associated with an expectation of greater requirements for flexibility, that 
is, an expansion in the line of products the firm plans to manufacture. In 
seventy five percent of the plants where managers say they plan to introduce 
PA in the next two years, they expect to increase the variety of products being 
manufactured, which suggests that plans to diversify away from product lines, 
or new customers, may be an important stimulus to technology adoption. 
[11] To David (1975), for example, scale implies both size and volume of production. 
Scale economies in the use of the reaper permitted larger size farms (in terms 
of acreage and hence volume of output) to amortize the cost of purchasing a 
reaper over its greater expected use in harvesting more acreage. With respect 
to scale as size, he finds that for farmers operating at a very small scale, only 
when the relative costs oflabor rose above some threshold, were new harvesting 
machines likely to be purchased. For a detailed review of the different measures 
and concepts, see Gold (1981). 
[12] Appendix Table 14.A2 shows averages of selected characteristics of establish-
ments, grouped by size of firm and by whether or not any programmable ma-
chine tools have been installed as of 1987. Larger firms (and larger scale facil-
ities) are often assumed to specialize in fewer products and longer production 
runs, and hence to be less flexible. We do not find support for this assumption. 
As shown in the table, establishments with high technical flexibility require-
ments are as prevalent in plants of large as in plants of small-size firms. 
[13] The estimates ofthe predicted probabilities ofPA adoption displayed in Figures 
14.1 to 14.5 and Table 14.2 were derived using the following method: For each 
variable Xj of value V, 
13 
(1) Zj=L:b;Xi+bj(Xj); i#j 
;=1 
(2) Prob (Adopt PA = llXj = V) = (e Zj )/(1 + eZj ). 
[14] For an analysis of subcontracting behavior, see Harrison and Kelley (1990) and 
Kelley and Harrison (1990). 
[15] Appendix Table 14.A2 shows the mean values of selected characteristics of 
establishments belonging to firms of different sizes. An inspection of the group 
means shows that among large firms (with greater than 500 employees) there 
are great differences in the scale of machining operations related to PA use, 
but for the smallest size firms (with fewer than 20 employees) there are no 
differences in scale and skill dependency related to PA use. 
[16] We cannot know from these data whether some of these linkages - especially 
to equipment vendors - existed before or were developed after purchasing the 
technology. However, when we compare the differences among non-adopters 
between those firms that are planning to purchase PA in the next two years 
and those that have no such investment plans, we find that well-linked firms 
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are more likely to have plans to introduce PA. Reliance on other users, active 
involvement in trade associations, and ties to business customers willing to 
share technical expertise are all significant factors, positively related to plans 
to purchase PA. However, firms with a tendency to rely more on equipment 
vendors or distributors as a source of information, independent of their con-
tacts through trade shows and professional association meetings, are no more 
likely to be planning to introduce the new technology. These findings provide 
additional evidence for our contention that in political-economic environments 
where networks of relationships among economic actors for transferring techni-
cal know-how flourish, there will be a more rapid diffusion of new technologies 
to small firms. 
[17] The details on average characteristics by PA use for plants grouped by these 
firm size categories can be found in Appendix Table 14.A2. 
[18] In a recent report of the US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
(Gorte, 1990), entitled Making Things Better: Competing in Manufacturing, 
firms in Japan were described as having business customers that are nearly 1.5 
times as likely to provide engineering support as we find among US firms. The 
higher incidence of such close relationships among Japanese firms may explain 
the higher rate of adoption of PA technology by very small Japanese subcon-
tractors (to that of US firms of similar size) reported in a recent unpublished 
survey of such firms undertaken by the Shoko Chukin Bank in 1988. 
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=loge average hourly wage of workers employed in machining 
occupations at the plant. 
=% of all production workers in the plant employed in machining 
occupations. 
=1, if production workforce is unionized; 
=0, if non-union 
=loge (total number of machine tools). 
=1, if 50 or more different parts or products manufactured with machine 
tools and if 50 percent or more of that machining output is produced in 
batch sizes smaller than 10 units; 
=0, otherwise. 
=loge (total company employment in the USA). 
=1, if computers are used for any of the following purposes: process 
planning / scheduling, quality assurance, process monitoring, materials 
flow/inventory control, materials/parts planning; 
=0, otherwise. 
=1, if plant manager considered any of the following sources of 
information to be very important for learning about new developments 
in machining technology: advertisements, direct mail 
(catalogues/brochures), articles in publications; 
=0, otherwise. 
=1, if plant manager considered either of the following sources of 
information to be very important for learning about new developments 
in marketing technology: sales representatives from manufacturers or 
sales representatives from distributors; 
=0, otherwise. 
=1, if plant manager considered conversations with individuals at other 
companies or conversations with individuals at other plants of this 
company to be a very important source of information about new 
developments in machining technology; 
=0, otherwise. 
=1, if plant manager considered presentations at technical society 
meetings or exhibits at trade shows to be very important sources of 
information for learning about machining technologies; 
=0, otherwise. 
=1, if plant manager reported that the output of machining operations 
was sold to customers outside this company; 
=0, if output of the machining process used solely internally by the firm. 
=1, if plant managers reported that products or parts were made to 
special order for customers who provided any of the following technical 
information: blueprints or drawings, written specification sheets 
detailing how each operation is to be performed, direct assistance from 
the customer's own manufacturing engineering or programming staff or 
other types of technical assistance; 
=0, if no technical assistance provided by special order customers. 
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Appendix Table 14.A2. Selected establishment characteristicsa by firm 
size and by PAuse. 
Firm size: <20 
Variable names NoPA AnyPA Total 
Total machine tools (scale) 13.00 16.00 14.00 
Plant employment 8.00 9.00 8.00 
Company employment (firm size) 8.00 10.00 9.00 
Company/plant employment 1.09 1.11 1.10 
Hourly wage (US$) 8.92 11.14 9.69 
Dependency on machining skills (%) 82.67 97.07 87.66 
Union 0.048 0.057 0.051 
Complementary IT application 0.205 0.336 0.250 
Customers 0.885 0.992 0.922 
Customer-provided technical assistance 0.679 0.914 0.760 
High flexibility requirements 0.295 0.430 0.342 
Brochures, ads, newsletters 0.348 0.373 0.357 
Equipment vendors' sales reps. 0.219 0.406 0.284 
Informal know-how exchange 0.527 0.619 0.559 
Trade & prof. association mtgs. 0.256 0.357 0.291 
% of total 65.40 34.60 100.00 
Unweighted N 96.00 56.00 152.00 
Appendix Table 14.A2. (continued) 
Firm size: 20-99 
Variable names NoPA AnyPA Total 
Total machine tools (scale) 30.00 30.00 30.00 
Plant employment 35.00 37.00 36.00 
Company employment (firm size) 41.00 42.00 41.00 
Company /plant employment 1.28 1.22 1.25 
Hourly wage (US$) 9.94 9.46 9.66 
Dependency on machining skills (%) 51.95 78.57 67.74 
Union 0.131 0.113 0.120 
Complementary IT application 0.801 0.671 0.724 
Customers 0.841 0.818 0.827 
Customer-provided technical assistance 0.625 0.689 0.663 
High flexibility requirements 0.381 0.350 0.363 
Brochures, ads, newsletters 0.345 0.433 0.397 
Equipment vendors' sales reps. 0.305 0.493 0.416 
Informal know-how exchange 0.396 0.550 0.487 
Trade & prof. association mtgs. 0.227 0.491 0.383 
% of total 40.70 59.30 100.00 
Unweighted N 90.00 145.00 235.00 
QMeans weighted by the reciprocal of the probability of selection in the sample stratum. 
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Appendix Table 14.A2. (continued) 
Firm size: 100-499 
Variable names NoPA AnyPA Total 
Total machine tools (scale) 22.00 46.00 38.00 
Plant employment 126.00 115.00 119.00 
Company employment (firm size) 211.00 190.00 197.00 
Company /plant employment 4.33 3.13 3.55 
Hourly wage (US$) 10.22 10.45 10.37 
Dependency on machining skills (%) 24.24 61.38 48.54 
Union 0.340 0.317 0.325 
Complementary IT application 0.862 0.853 0.856 
Customers 0.736 0.851 0.811 
Customer-provided technical assistance 0.512 0.607 0.574 
High flexibility requirements 0.245 0.327 0.289 
Brochures, ads, newsletters 0.270 0.434 0.377 
Equipment vendors' sales reps. 0.219 0.511 0.410 
Informal know-how exchange 0.283 0.446 0.390 
Trade & prof. association mtgs. 0.318 0.447 0.402 
% of total 34.60 65.40 100.00 
Unweighted N 60.00 114.00 174.00 
Appendix Table 14.A2. (continued) 
Firm size: ;:::500 
Variable names NoPA AnyPA Total 
Total machine tools (scale) 19.00 121.00 102.00 
Plant employment 230.00 595.00 530.00 
Company employment (firm size) 57,862.00 23,627.00 29,807.00 
Company /plant employment 673.19 85.60 191.67 
Hourly wage (US$) 10.91 10.74 10.77 
Dependency of machining skills (%) 16.17 53.67 46.90 
Union 0.492 0.493 0.493 
Complementary IT application 0.881 0.946 0.934 
Customers 0.533 0.778 0.734 
Customer-provided technical assistance 0.260 0.445 0.412 
High flexibility requirements 0.414 0.298 0.319 
Brochures, ads, newsletters 0.304 0.560 0.513 
Equipment vendors' sales reps. 0.371 0.483 0.462 
Informal know-how exchange 0.444 0.528 0.513 
Thade & prof. association mtgs. 0.356 0.615 0.568 
% of total 18.10 81.90 100.00 
Unweighted N 38.00 162.00 200.00 
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